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HIDDEN RACIAL BIAS: WHY WE NEED TO TALK
WITH JURORS ABOUT FERGUSON
Patrick C. Brayer
As recent tragic events confirm, issues of race frame our national
identity and define our capacity to achieve true equality for all individuals.
By its very nature and traditions, the law is a profession tasked with
confronting inequality and discrimination in our society. As issues of race
continue to influence our communities, nation, and world, the legal
profession will be charged with leading future discussions on how prejudice
and bias affect our clients. Unfortunately, as legal professionals, we still
struggle with the question of whether to talk about race in voir dire.1 This
essay discusses our obligation as judges, academics, and practitioners to
understand how unconscious racial bias exists in the hidden belief systems
of many, if not all, jurors. These actors must also recognize that open
dialogue in jury selection is a proven strategy against the effects of
individual undetected prejudice. Furthermore, attorneys must concede
hidden bias in themselves before fully comprehending the devastating
impacts of racial biases. The events of the last four months in Ferguson,
Missouri have exposed potential jurors to experiences dominated by issues
of race. The opinions, beliefs, and prejudices of future fact-finders will be
greatly shaped by how they perceive these events and interpret the issues.
I.
“CLASHES, CHAOS”
“POLICE AGAIN USE TEAR GAS ON FERGUSON PROTESTERS”
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
8-18-2014
On August 18, 2014, I found myself in a routine situation for a career
public defender: preparing to select a jury in a criminal case by questioning
the citizens of St. Louis County, Missouri. Inside of the courtroom, the
setting was normal, but the scene outside the courthouse was anything but
ordinary. Nine days previously, less than ten miles from where my venire
panel sat, eighteen-year-old Michael Brown was shot and killed by a police
officer in nearby Ferguson, Missouri. National and local media had
descended upon Ferguson and broadcasted images of nightly confrontations
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between police and demonstrators who firmly believed that an unarmed
African-American teenager had been unjustifiably gunned down. Social,
Internet, television, and print media were flooded with stories and images of
grief, looting, tear gas, political disputes, tactical teams, and burning
buildings.
Since the shooting, my assembled panel of potential jurors were
exposed to—and in some cases participated in—a national debate on many
issues, including how law enforcement and local courts treat people of color
and the rights of law enforcement to use force to defend themselves and
their communities. On this Monday morning of scheduled jury service,
these citizens entered a courthouse that just a few days before—and again
the following day—was guarded by a sizeable police presence armed with
riot gear and hand ties, poised to repel protesters.
The potential jurors before me all had opinions and experiences
concerning how minorities are generally treated by police. Many held views
on how police and citizens treated each other on the streets of Ferguson. As
a litigator, I needed to know the beliefs, attitudes, and biases of my
potential jurors. But I still harbored a very private concern: that this subject
was too controversial and too personal, and would become a distraction
from the trial. I feared the jurors would resent me and my client for
introducing the issue.
It was hypocritical of me to consider avoiding a dialogue about
Ferguson with prospective jurors, seeing as I have publicly preached the
importance of discussing issues of race in voir dire.2 Race was not a major
issue in my case, but how my jury viewed law enforcement was an
important concern. Yet, I still harbored doubts about saying the word
“Ferguson.”
An attorney’s own private fears are just one roadblock preventing him
or her from discussing race during voir dire. Some judges prohibit any
mention of race by litigators.3 Thus, structural, strategic, and emotional
barriers prevent litigators from engaging in an open discussion of race in
voir dire. But it remains critically important that actors in the justice
system, such as myself, overcome these barriers and address issues of race
during the jury selection process. To emphasize this point, this essay
surveys psychological research and jury studies that indicate just how large
a role race can play in jurors’ decisionmaking processes.
II.
VOIR DIRE AND UNCONSCIOUS BIAS
In 2006, social psychologist Samuel Sommers studied the impact of
race-related voir dire questions on jurors by simulating realistic trial
2
Patrick C. Brayer, Batson, Empowerment and New Jury Models: The Case for ‘Open Inquiry,’
33 CHAMPION 26 (2009).
3
Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71,
98 (2010) [http://perma.cc/GN9Q-KV43].
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conditions for mock juries and recording the responses of participants.4
Individuals “were less likely to vote guilty before deliberating and gave
lower estimates of the likelihood of the Black defendant’s guilt” when
asked race-related questions in voir dire.5 His results suggest that engaging
a juror with questions about race diminishes the effects of embedded
individual bias on the trial process. A juror’s decisionmaking system is
somehow influenced when reminded to render a judgment “free from
prejudice.”6 Thus, a simple interactive reminder to a juror to consciously
put prejudice aside appears to invite a self-assessment of the individual’s
bias and may produce discernable results. Individuals generally fail to
perceive their own biases until they are requested to consider issues of race
and encouraged to articulate how these issues have framed their experiences
and belief system.7 Individual and interactive prompting by an attorney
during voir dire appears to diminish the impact of individual hidden bias,
allowing the facts of the case and the instructions of the court to emerge as
the dominant influence on juror decisionmaking.
In addition to the work of researchers, a growing number of legal
scholars have identified “race-related voir dire” as a way to moderate a
“juror[’s] own racial attitudes” by making race “salient.”8 This area of
scholarship reframes the goal of voir dire to be the self-identification of
implicit bias by each individual juror.9 Voir dire can play an important role
in defining principles of fairness and equality for each member on the
panel, encouraging jurors to avoid subconscious personal prejudice. The
interactive nature of discussing the issue of prejudice with jurors makes the
goal of avoiding bias “contextually” important, and allows the court or
litigator to issue “strong normative goals to avoid bias.”10 When conducted
“in an unhurried, relaxed, and non-judgmental environment,” the resulting
dialogue can diminish the impact of “racial attitudes.”11
Racial identity research also explains why the events in Ferguson are a
necessary subject for jury selection. When individuals are confronted with
an event involving racial issues, their ego selects a “racial identity status,”

4
Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberation, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 601
(2006) [http://perma.cc/HTZ4-A9Y6].
5
Id. at 606.
6
Id.
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See id. at 606–08.
8
Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL &
ETHNIC JUST. 165, 191 (2011) (quoting Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We
Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 997, 1011 (2003) [http://perma.cc/YTZ2-P2NE]).
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allowing them to interpret the event.12 Unfortunately, this identity can lack
maturity, and if not confronted with new and meaningful information about
race, individuals remain at their original, ego-motivated identity status.13
Depending on the maturity of a person’s racial identity, their status could
range from being oblivious to the existence of racism in society to a belief
system where they self-identify and confront individual racist beliefs.14
The tragic death of Michael Brown and all that followed triggered a
quest within many to protect their sense of self and rationalize events absent
any substantive dialogue. Because the issues raised by Ferguson will persist
in the minds of many jurors, a race-related voir dire acknowledging hidden
bias is essential when promoting prejudice-free proceedings.15
Unfortunately, some judges prohibit any mention of race by litigators.
When a judge bans discussions of race during courtroom proceedings, the
system facilitates the continued existence of hidden prejudice in the factfinding process. If race-based attitudes are informing jurors to an extent that
is outcome-determinative, legal professionals must be willing to facilitate
an open exchange of all beliefs in the jury selection process. But as legal
professionals, are we uncomfortable with the concept of unconscious bias?
Is it easier to blame unfairness on the overt bigotry of a few, rather than
accept the existence of implicit bias in everyone—even ourselves?
III.
HIDDEN BIAS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
In 2010, Shankar Vedantam explored the world of “the hidden brain”
and concluded that the human brain is “designed to be biased.”16 Individuals
distinguish differences in individual faces as a mechanism of survival.17 Our
unconscious mind allows us to make quick judgments regarding the
thousands of seemingly identical faces we witnessed as developing

12
Janet E. Helms, An Update of Helms’s White and People of Color Racial Identity Models, in
HANDBOOK OF MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING 187 (Joseph G. Ponterotto et al. eds., 1995).
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See id. at 186.
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See Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 166–67
(2004) (discussing Professor Janet Helms’ proposal of a “racial identity development model to describe
how . . . behaviors[] and interactions with members of different racial groups are reflective of their racial
identity. Presenting separate models for whites and persons of color, she proposes a set of ego statuses to
describe how racial identity development can range from less mature or sophisticated conceptions of
one’s racial self in relation to members of a different race, to more mature or sophisticated ego statuses.”
(footnotes omitted)) [http://perma.cc/TC83-7RBH].
15
See PBS NewsHour: Shields and Brooks on the Ferguson Ruling, Hagel Resignation (PBS
television broadcast Nov. 28, 2014), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/shields-brooksferguson-ruling-hagel-resignation [http://perma.cc/LG84-UJ3E], for a discussion of how the events in
Ferguson and the grand jury decision of November 24, 2014 weave into a broader national narrative.
16
SHANKAR VEDANTAM, THE HIDDEN BRAIN: HOW OUR UNCONSCIOUS MINDS ELECT
PRESIDENTS, CONTROL MARKETS, WAGE WARS, AND SAVE OUR LIVES 61 (2010).
17
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infants.18 Vedantam argues that white Americans are some of the least
skilled in cross-cultural and interracial identification because of the
ubiquitous worldwide exposure to white American faces through television
and other media.19 “In criminal justice settings, interracial eyewitness
identifications are far more prone to error than situations where witnesses
and suspects belong to the same race.”20 Unfortunately, the American legal
system may be the first to deny the existence of a hidden bias, a denial
“premised on the notion that deliberate and conscious thinking are all that
matter.”21
The developing “hidden brain” is programmed to learn through
repeated observations of our world and is prompted to make unconscious
judgments based on associations and generalities.22 As infants, our
unconscious learning absorbs an American culture where children see
thousands of observed interactions, marriages, and friendships segregated
by race.23 The hidden brain “conclude[s] that there must be an unspoken
rule in society that forces whites to marry other whites, because everywhere
[it] look[s], most of the white husbands seem to be married to white
wives.”24 Even when conscious learning is used to counter the prejudicial
effects of hidden bias, cultural messages repeatedly communicate to the
developing brain that people of color are different from people who are
white.25
Researchers have linked this existence of hidden bias to examples of
inconsistent sentencing in the criminal justice system. Psychologists at
Stanford University found that an individual’s skin tone and other features
played a role in sentencing.26 Researchers asked “a large group of
independent people who knew nothing about the cases” to rank the faces of
individuals convicted of circumstances “serious enough to warrant the death
penalty” on the “degree to which they looked stereotypically black.”27
Individuals who appeared more “stereotypically black” were more than
twice as likely to have received the death penalty.28 Researchers also
concluded the same sentencing disparities did not exist when the defendant
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and victim belonged to the same race.29 Researchers noted that “[s]omething
about black-on-white crime activated unconscious stereotypes that linked
criminality with race in the minds of jurors.”30
Vedantam concluded that inconsistent treatment of black defendants by
the criminal justice system is unlikely to be the result of mass deliberate
bigotry and prejudice on the part of judges, lawyers, and jurors.31 A more
likely explanation is that unconscious bias accumulates and may influence
well-intentioned people to render unfair judgments.32 Compounding the
problem are members of our legal system who refuse to accept the impact
of hidden prejudice, assuming that “biased outcomes result from deliberate
bias and that such errors can be overcome by setting up a confrontational
system where prosecutors and defense attorneys keep one another honest.”33
Because of this presumption, our system of justice “is designed to fail
regularly.”34
If openly discussing issues of race is an essential step in the selfidentification of individual prejudice, why are legal professionals reluctant
to engage in a jury selection process that considers the existence of hidden
bias? The answer to this question may be rooted in the following premise:
to find unconscious prejudice in others, we must accept the existence of our
own individual hidden bias. When confronted with issues involving race,
our ego selects a dominant racial identity status to interpret the event.35 The
selection of a status protects our “sense of well-being and self-esteem.”36 As
legal professionals, we should be willing to mature in our own personal
racial identity status by acknowledging that hidden bias exists in all
individuals—including ourselves. We should not let our profession fail to
evolve because of a system-wide reluctance to engage our jurors and
ourselves in conversations about racism, bias, and prejudice.
IV.
REFLECTIONS FOLLOWING THE GRAND JURY DECISION
I walked through a closed, barricaded, and relatively empty St. Louis
County Court and Justice Center the morning after the grand jury decision
on the case of Michael Brown’s death. As I observed the empty halls, I
reflected on how a normal practice day in the life of a legal community had
come to a complete stop because of events on the streets—arguably linked
to a lack of a meaningful national dialogue on issues of race, prejudice, and
bias. I noted the absence of the normal assembly of lawyers, typically
29
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engaged in spirited discussions about their clients, and I remembered how
my colleagues are very effective at promoting nonjudgmental but
meaningful discussions between individuals of different beliefs when they
select a jury. I also considered the week to follow when thousands of
potential jurors will descend on courthouses around the nation, fresh from
holiday gatherings but consumed with thoughts about what they observed
the previous week in Ferguson and St. Louis County, Missouri. I realized as
one practitioner, I can’t change the entire voir dire process or lead a national
debate, but I can change what I discuss with individual jurors.
As a profession, we can take certain important steps to remain relevant
in the face of current events. First, we should discuss the importance of
acknowledging issues of race and bias in voir dire. My thoughts have been
communicated in this piece, but I appreciate the concerns and insights
expressed by Professor Forman in her companion essay37 and eagerly await
new scholarship on both sides of this question. Second, we need to identify
and eliminate the legal obstacles and emotional barriers that will prevent a
practitioner from engaging in a dialogue about race. Professor Joy’s essay
speaks to the duty of lawyers to identify when and how they should discuss
bias in voir dire.38 I strongly agree with his point that litigators must
confront their individual fears of addressing race with jurors.39 Third,
practitioners need to succeed at what they do best as a community of
professionals by advancing and standardizing a trial skill: the effective
questioning of jurors about hidden bias, prejudice, and race. Litigators of all
disciplines currently rank among the best at moderating and welcoming
relaxed, insightful dialogues about individual beliefs. By taking these steps,
practitioners and the legal profession as a whole can both protect clients and
contribute to a much-needed conversation that will help return relevance
and life to every courthouse.
V.
CONCLUSION
Open, ugly, and dangerous racism against people of color still exists
today and the legal profession must continue to fight against its existence in
and impact on our society. However, a lack of outward bigotry does not
excuse lawyers from being unmindful of the biases that lurk within.
Michael Brown’s death reminded us that issues of race, income inequality,
and law enforcement continue to dominate our society. Potential jurors will
arrive at the courthouse doors with a belief system and subconscious
informed by their race-related experiences, and a perceived narrative based
on current events. Because many of our potential jurors will be impacted in
different ways by this tragedy, we must identify and discuss hidden bias in
37
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voir dire and allow the events in Ferguson to serve as a catalyst for honest
dialogue—specifically, an open dialogue with our jurors and a reflective
dialogue with ourselves.
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